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Abstract 
 
This paper describes the results of a survey of informal-sector firms in Pakistan.  Firms belong to 
the informal sector mainly because of scarce financial resources. There are significant 
differences in the level of wages and the flexibility of wages with the informal sector having both 
lower wages and greater flexibility than the formal sector.  While minimum wages are less 
binding in the informal sector, indexation of wages to inflation is more common. In spite of these 
differences the reasons for not cutting wages in a recession are similar between the two sectors. 
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1. Introduction 
It is striking that most research in labour economics is focused on the developed economies 
while most workers in the world economy are employed in the informal labour markets in 
developing countries. The objective of this paper is to help bridge this gap by exploring wage-
setting behaviour in the informal labour market in Pakistan and to compare it with wage setting 
in the formal sector.
1
 Pakistan is ideally suited to the study of the informal labour market.  The 
informal sector employment accounts for 76.43 per cent of the labour force, while 73.8 per cent 
of the non-agricultural labour force is employed in the informal market (see Figure A1 in 
Appendix A). The informal sector is therefore the largest source of total employment.   
The informal economy in Pakistanis is comprised of small firms that are allowed to stay 
unregistered by the government while operating within the law in contrast to the underground 
economy and the illegal economy.
2
 We define the informal sector as consisting of firms that 
employ less than ten paid employees. The Pakistan Bureau of Statistics has defined the informal 
economy as consisting of household enterprises employing less than ten persons and also 
including all agricultural activities. Instead of using those criteria we take the informal sector as 
consisting of enterprises operated by single individuals or households that are not separate legal 
entities from their owners and employ less than ten paid workers. These include “family units” 
(those operated by nonprofessional with or without contributing family workers) and/or “micro-
enterprises” (productive units with no more than nine employees).3 The main reason for choosing 
                                                          
1
 See Ahmed et al. (2014) on wage setting in the formal sector. 
2
 The  labour market can broadly be split into (i) the formal economy consisting of registered firms with businesses 
that comply with laws and regulations, (ii) the informal economy that comprises micro-house based firms that are 
allowed to be unregistered but operating within the law, (iii) the underground economy, where firms produce legal 
output but choose to remain unregistered mostly to avoid taxes, and lastly (iv) the illegal economy that produces 
illegal output in addition to remaining unregistered and avoiding taxes. 
3
 Enumerators in our sample surveyed roughly 2 per cent of firms with more than nine paid workers. We do not 
exclude these firms from our analysis since that they are not registered firms. ???  are they included in the analysis 
of wage setting etc. or are they only included when describing the characteristics of firms?  
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ten workers as a threshold in our wage setting survey is that we wanted to study the wage setting 
behaviour of firms with at least some kind of paid work force while controlling for membership 
of the informal sector by ensuring that a firm is not registered as a legal entity.
4
 
 We will show how the informal sector differs from the formal one in many respects while 
also showing some similarities. Limited access to capital markets, credit constraints, higher 
failure rates, lower wages, more frequent wage setting and the irrelevance of the minimum wage 
set the two sectors apart while they share reservations about cutting wages in a recession out of 
fear of losing the best workers or seeing effort slide. In essence the informal sector has firms that 
are more sensitive to shocks employing workers with little bargaining power or protection by the 
state.  
 
2. Survey  
Our survey covers 960 informal-sector manufacturing firms and also draws on past surveys of 
wage- and price setting in the formal sector as a comparison.
5
 The design of the survey is based 
on Druant et al. (2012), while the comparison is made with Ahmed et al. (2014) with some 
modification to suit the particularities of the informal sector. We included sections for profiling 
firms and proprietors, while the main survey covers a wide range of characteristics including 
employment size, remunerative decisions, cost minimizing strategies and linkages to the formal 
sector. We also queried about reasons for the firms belonging to the informal sector. 
                                                          
4
 There is an underground sector in Pakistan that includes firms that may have more than ten employees and are not 
registered anywhere; also there might be registered firms that are partially informal in order to keep a fraction of 
their workers and/or sales hidden from government regulators, and/or fail to comply with at least some government 
regulations. These firms are not included in our survey. There are also firms that might underreport their workforce 
to avoid being registered, so there might be many firms in our study that might actually have ten or more employees 
and underreport their workers to our enumerators.   
5
 Survey results for the price and wage setting behaviour of formal sector firms are presented in Choudhary et al. 
(2011) and Ahmed et al. (2014) respectively. 
4 
 
The survey sample consists of informal sector manufacturing firms in Punjab and Sindh
6
 
and  took  place between January and February 2011 and between October 2012 and January 
2013,respectively, in collaboration with the statistical agencies of Pakistan.
7,8
For the province of 
Punjab, we found that the Small and Medium Enterprises Development Authority (SMEDA) 
maintains a data base on small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in Punjab province, although 
they included many medium-sized registered firms as well.
9
 For the purpose of our survey we 
only include enterprises with less than ten employees.
10
 Another benefit of using the SMEDA 
frame is that, as in the formal sector sampling frame such as the Census of Manufacturing 
Industries (CMI), these firms are categorized as per International Standard Industrial 
Classification (ISIC). From this survey we have selected a sample of 500 informal-sector firms 
stratified over the subsectors within manufacturing using the Pakistan Standard Industrial 
Classification(PSIC) classification (code 15 to 36, excluding 30).
11
 Unfortunately, SMEDA did 
not maintain such extensive firm listing for Sindh. After exploring many other options we were 
left with no other choice than to select a non-probability sample.  However, we went through 
                                                          
6
 Two other provinces i.e. Khyber PakhtunKhuwa and Baluchistan were not selected for security reasons. 
7
 The interviewers were very experienced and were provided with specialized training, both theoretical and practical. 
In addition, economists from the Central Bank randomly audited 10% of live interviews for quality assurance of the 
interviewing process. 
8
 The process of selecting an informal sector sample with adequate sub-sector representation is not an easy task 
because most of these small firms are not registered and have no proper record register by law.  A few agencies do 
maintain some sort of registers for details on small firms. However, the lack of coordination among these agencies 
usually makes it difficult to find an appropriate sampling frame for the informal sector firms. 
9
This is a public sector institution that helps to develop small and medium enterprises by facilitating business 
development through seminars, workshops and training programmes. SMEDA Punjab regularly prepares profiles of 
different industrial clusters in Punjab. These profiles provide basic information on the history and background of 
clusters, core cluster actors, current scenario of cluster, and the analysis of business operations, institutional setups, 
issues and problems and potential businesses in particular cluster. 
10
 Around 220,000 firms are included in their database, while short listing of firms as per our definition resulted in 
around 207,000 firms remaining in our frame.  
11
 The activities are: 15-(food products & beverages), 16-(tobacco products), 17-(manufacture of textiles), 18-
(wearing apparel), 19-(leather products), 20-(wood & wood products), 21-(paper & paper products), 22-(publishing, 
printing & reproduction), 23-(petroleum), 24-(chemicals & chemical products), 25-(rubber & plastics products), 26-
(other non-metallic mineral products), 27-(basic metals), 28-(fabricated metal products), 29-(machinery & 
equipment N.E.C.), 31-(electrical machinery & apparatus N.E.C.), 32-(radio, TV & communication equipment), 33-
(medical & optical instruments), 34-(motor vehicles & trailers), 35-(other transport equipment), 36-(furniture). 
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internal exercises to ensure adequate geographical, size and sector representations.
12
 To verify 
the extent of sample representativeness of the population of industries within the manufacturing 
sector, we compared the sector-wise distribution of own-account workers´ category in the 
manufacturing sector of Punjab from Labour Force Survey (LFS) with SMEDA's Punjab sample. 
The distribution turned out to be similar.
13
 This exercise increased our confidence in using 
Sindh’s distribution of own account workers from LFS for the industry representation of Sindh. 
We resorted to this approximation because, as explained earlier, in Sindh no frame was available 
and this move helped us avoid over representation of easily searchable industries. In addition, we 
also utilised many other sources of information to find geographical details such as: Sindh 
Employees' Social Security Institution (SESSI), newspapers, knowledge of local enumerators as 
well other informal firms.  The sample for Sindh includes 350 private informal enterprises.
14
 
We will compare the informal sector to its formal sector counterpart. A description of the 
formal manufacturing sector sample is included in Ahmed et al. (2014) and Choudhary et al. 
(2011). We describe the sample here only briefly. The survey was carried out in Punjab and 
Sindh between December 2009-March 2010 and June 2010-October 2011 respectively for 1025 
formal sector firms in the manufacturing sector.
15
 The manufacturing sample was based on the 
data register maintained by the Bureau of Statistics of Punjab and Sindh for a census of 
manufacturing industries (CMI).
16
 We selected a stratified random sample based on economic 
                                                          
12
 There is a possibility of over-representation of very small enterprises (three or fewer employees) due to their 
abundance. Also not controlling for geography might result in the overrepresentation of certain localities. Surveyors 
were instructed not to select too many firms within one locality or sector.  
13
The distribution of economic activities remains quite similar except for two economic activities; the correlation of 
sector-wise distribution after omitting the two outliers is 0.7. 
14
 Family businesses with no paid workforce were omitted from the study of wage-setting behaviour and replaced by 
firms in the same type of economic activity having fewer than ten paid workers.  This explains why the observations 
on firm and proprietor’s profiles are 960 while surveys on wage-setting behaviour include only 850 firms.  
15
The provinces of Khyber Pakhtun-khuwa and Baluchistan are also missing from this survey due to security reason.   
16
The manufacturing sample covers firms with economic activity codes from 15 to 36 (excluding 30) according to 
the Pakistan Standard Industrial Classification (PSIC). 
6 
 
activity (subeconomic activities in manufacturing) and firm size (small, medium and large).
17
 
The survey was designed to obtain answers with respect to the main occupational group of 
permanent employees divided into three broad categories: white collar, skilled blue collar, skilled 
worker and unskilled blue collar workers. 
 
3. Characteristics of firms and their owners 
The firms in our informal-sector sample have on average of 5.1 workers, out of which there is on 
average only one working proprietor (1.1 average) and every other firm has one unpaid family 
member (0.61 average).
18
 Firms that have paid employees have on average 3.6 regular 
employees. Note that we omit all surveyed firms that do not have any paid workers when 
analysing wage setting, but we include these while describing the characteristics of the informal-
sector firms. Younger firms are more likely to belong to the informal sector while older firms are 
more likely to belong to the formal sector reflecting stability of business activity. Formal-sector 
small firms are more profitable and micro-firms created in the informal sector may eventually 
face the decision to remain at a certain size or move to the formal sector to extend the scale of 
production (Di Giannatale et al. (2013).
19
 
As shown in Table 1 below, around half of the firms (48.6 %) are younger than ten years; 
80 percent of firms are younger than 20 years, and the distribution shows a sharp decline with 
older businesses. Average years in business in our sample are 14.6 years with a median of 12 
                                                          
17
 Firm size in manufacturing industry was defined on the basis of employment; firms in the manufacturing sector 
were split into three categories: 10- 50, 51-250 and more than 250 employees as small, medium and large firms 
respectively. We are comparing only manufacturing sectors for both the formal and the informal sector. 
18
 See questionnaire in Appendix B. 
19
 Ingram et al. (2007) show that for Africa, 50 per cent of informal-sector firms are less than ten years old 
suggesting that either informal firms tend to fail within the first ten years or join the formal sector. 
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years.
20
 Informal businesses have smaller chances of being sold as a business entity; instead they 
run in the family. In our sample, only 4 percent of informal-sector firms were purchased as 
operating businesses, 62 per cent were created by the current owner and 34 percent were passed 
on within the family. Statistics for the age and forms of acquisition of firms are consistent, i.e. 
self-established firms are younger (12 years) than businesses run within a family (19 years) or 
businesses that have been purchased (16 years).  
Table 1.Informal sector Firm Profile 
 
        
  Total 
No paid 
worker 
1-3 paid 
workers 
3 or more paid 
workers 
Firm age (Average years) 14.6 15.1 14.6 14.5 
Firm Age Distribution 
(%) 
       1-5 Years 17.3 16.0 17.8 17.0 
   6-10 Years 30.4 33.0 30.5 29.4 
   11-20 Years 31.9 26.4 30.1 35.8 
   21-50 Years 17.3 21.7 18.6 14.3 
   More than 50 years 3.1 2.8 2.9 3.4 
Business Acquired (% Distn.) 
      Self –established 61.7 49.5 62.7 64.0 
   Family business 34.5 44.8 34.0 32.3 
   Purchased 3.8 5.7 3.4 3.7 
 
Table 2 shows the personal characteristics of proprietors in the informal sector. A higher 
percentage of relatively old/ mature and married entrepreneurs are likely to belong to the 
informal sector on a permanent basis.
21
 Similarly, informal-sector, family-run enterprises may 
count on unpaid family workers and women, so married people are more likely to be self-
employed in the informal sector. Due to cultural norms, we may not find a lot of these businesses 
headed by females though and proprietors’ profiles show that 98 percent of informal proprietors 
                                                          
20
 Burki (1990) find a similar trend for informal sector enterprises in Pakistan. 
21
 A study of Mexican micro-firms shows that the average age of owners of micro-firms is 44 years, around 70 per 
cent of them are married and about 26 per cent of all micro-firms are run by women. It is observed that most of the 
micro-firm owners have only finished primary or elementary high school education; only 8 per cent of informal 
micro-firm owners have completed a college education Di Giannatale et al. (2013).  
8 
 
are male, 92 percent are married and their average age is 42 years (median 40 years). The median 
age of proprietors in the informal sector is higher than the median age of the labour force in 
Pakistan i.e. 30-34 years.
22
 
We asked the owners of firms in the informal sector about their investment in human 
capital through education and training expecting employment in the informal sector to be more 
common among workers with the less formal education, although formal education doesn’t 
guarantee employment in the formal sector as shown by Bivens et al. (2005). The education 
profile reveals that 84 percent of employees have formal education, although 41 per cent have 
only completed primary school. Similarly, 95 percent do not have any formal technical training 
in their relevant field. Finally, the level of formal (and technical) education tends to increase with 
firm size. There is the possibility that the informal sector may act as a transition for workers to 
migrate from rural areas to enter the urban labour force, Todaro's (1969) hypothesis. However, it 
turns out that only 22.3% of proprietors migrated from rural to urban areas, although there might 
be many others who migrated with their parents.
23
 
  
                                                          
22
(Burki, Urban Informal Sector in Pakistan: Some Selected Issues, 1990)
 
show that the median age range of 
entrepreneurs in the informal sector in Pakistan is 21-40 years, while Kemal and Mahmood (1998) find the average 
age of self-employed workers in the informal manufacturing sector is 37 years.  
23
 A similar trend was found for informal-sector workers as well in an older study where 28 per cent of workers in 
the informal sector had rural links with only ten per cent having migrated themselves (Burki, 1990). 
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Table 2.Informal Sector Proprietor Profile 
 
  Total 
 No paid 
worker 
1-3 paid 
workers 
3 or more paid 
workers 
Proprietors' Age (Average Years) 42.0  42.7 42.1 41.7 
Education Profile (% Distn.) 
 
 
      Illiterate 15.7  32.4 15.5 11.2 
   Below primary 10.2  16.2 10.5 8.3 
   Primary Passed 30.8  41.9 31.8 26.5 
   Matric Passed 22.8  8.6 22.2 27.5 
   Intermediate Passed 13.1  1.0 12.3 17.4 
   Degree Holder 7.4  0.0 7.7 9.1 
Formal Technical Education (% Share) 4.6  1.9 4.7 5.2 
Current Earning Status (% Distn.) 
 
 
      Higher 67.8  76.7 67.1 66.3 
   Lower 14.3  11.6 15.7 13.3 
   Same 17.8  11.6 17.2 20.3 
Rural to Urban Migration(% Share) 22.3  16.3 22.6 23.5 
 
 
Responses to questions about the owners’ previous employment history are reported 
below in Table 3, while Table 4 shows a further break down. The responses reveal that 64.3 
percent of our 960 subjects were involved in the same or a similar business in the past, while 
19.5 percent moved from other businesses. Leaving out the 16.2 percent who were either 
unemployed or out of labour force, the rest of them have previous employment experience that 
helps them manage and run their businesses efficiently.
24
This shows that occupational-choice is 
sticky.  These results are partitioned in Table 4 by employment (self- versus paid employment) 
and sector (formal- versus informal) types. Out of the 64.3 percent of owners who had been 
working in a similar business, we find that 95.8 percent were already working in the informal 
sector; 54.6 percent of these were previously in paid employment within the informal sector and 
became business owners in the informal sector, while 45.4 percent of them were already self-
                                                          
24
 Young firms usually run by younger workers have higher rates of failure (Evans and Leighton, 1989; Jovanovic, 
1982).  
10 
 
employed. Similarly, out of the 19.5 percent of owners of informal-sector workers who had been 
working in other firms, 83.1 percent were already working in the informal sector; for 48 percent 
of owners it was only a change of business, while 52 percent of them were in paid employment. 
The remaining 17 percent came from the formal sector, out of which 94 per cent were previously 
in paid employment in the formal sector.
25
 This appears to suggest that employment in the 
informal sector tends to be sticky. 
                           Table 3.Employment History of Informal Sector Proprietor 
  Similar business 64.3 
Other business 19.5 
Unemployed 13.3 
Out of labour force 2.9 
Total 100 
 
Table 4.Employment History of Informal Sector Proprietor 
 
 
Similar Business Different Business 
Previous 
Employment Status Formal Informal Total Formal Informal Total 
Total 4.2 95.8 100 16.9 83.1 100 
Within Distribution of Sectors 
     Employed 80.8 54.6 55.7 93.5 52.0 59.0 
Self employed 19.2 45.4 44.3 6.5 48.0 41.0 
Age 45.3 41.3 
 
48.0 44.7 
  
Indeed to further corroborate the sticky informal-sector employment phenomenon, we find in 
Table 5 below that a majority of our 960 owners with previous employment history were already 
working in the informal sector (92.9 percent to be precise) and only 7 percent came from the 
formal sector. Therefore, migration out of the informal sector is low. Similarly, out of the same 
                                                          
25
 Middle-aged workers who lose their job in the informal sector and are unable to find a new one may turn to self-
employment in the informal sector as a safety net (Perry et al., 2007) (p. 59). 
11 
 
group 43.6 percent were already working as self-employed in the same or a similar business and 
the remaining 56.4 percent were paid employees at other firms.  
 
Table 5.History of Current Earnings compared to Past 
 
 
Previous employment Previous Sector 
   Employed Self employed Formal Informal Total 
Percentage Distribution 56.4 43.6 7.1 92.9 
 Distribution within Each Category 
    Higher 72.6 61.9 50.0 69.3 68.0 
Lower 13.8 14.8 26.8 13.2 14.1 
Same 13.6 23.3 23.2 17.5 17.9 
 
We asked the business owners to compare their current earnings to previous earnings and 
report the results in Table 5. The table shows that 68 per cent (last column) reported that their 
earnings had increased; 14.1 percent of entrepreneur reported a fall in their current earnings, 
while for 17.9 percent earnings remained similar. Thus a total of 85.7 percent of business owners 
are enjoying either the same or higher current earnings with probably higher employment status. 
Workers who have transited from being a paid employee to becoming a business owners reported 
the greatest increase of income, especially within similar businesses. This implies that workers 
first learn the trade as employees and then establish their own businesses. Similarly, migration 
from the formal sector shows the smallest increase in current earnings. 
 
4. Reasons for Operating in the Informal Sector 
We asked owners of informal sector firms to rank their reasons for being in that sector. The 
results are in Table 6 below. Scarce financial resources is the number one reason for businesses 
to be stuck in the informal sector. The nature of their businesses and the ease of running 
12 
 
businesses in the informal sector come second and third as reasons for operating in the informal 
sector. An interesting picture emerges when we re-rank the top three mean scores by 
employment size (i.e. no regular paid worker,
26
 1to 3 regular workers and more than 3 paid 
workers): While scarce financial resources remain the most important factor for all the three 
categories, the ease of running a business is among top three reasons for staying in the informal 
sector only for relatively bigger firms (i.e. 3 or more regular workers). In other words, larger 
informal firms simply find it cumbersome to join the formal sector. As more efficient firms 
survive and become larger their needs for enforceable contracts, formal credit markets, and 
access to public risk-pooling mechanisms increase, and so does their degree of formality or depth 
of participation in societal institutions. 
 
Table 6. Reasons for operating in the informal sector 
  
 
  Rank for Importance 
  
Mean 
Scores
a
 
% of 
Firms
b
 
No Paid 
workers 
1-3 Paid 
Workers 
 3> Paid 
Workers 
Low Financial Resources 1.7 81.5 1 1 1 
Nature and Scale of Business suitable for IB 2.4 57.0 3 2 2 
Easy to run IB 2.7 48.7 7 5 3 
Lack of Opportunity in Formal Sector 2.7 47.5 8 3 4 
Hard to register business due to cost 2.7 49.9 4 4 6 
Avoid bureaucracy/ Government 2.8 42.7 6 7 5 
Low skill level 2.8 38.7 2 6 10 
Hard to register business due to information 2.9 41.9 5 8 7 
Returns in IB are higher 3.0 31.7 10 9 8 
Do not value benefits of formal Business 3.2 22.6 9 10 12 
Sufficient product demand by other firms 3.2 22.7 11 11 9 
Client are large formal Firms 3.4 17.1 12 12 11 
a: 1, 2, 3 and 4 denote “very important”, “important”, “of minor importance” and “unimportant” 
b: percentage of firms responding “important” or “very important” 
 
 
                                                          
26
 We omit these firms from the sample when studying wage setting but include them when exploring the nature of 
informal sector firms. 
13 
 
5. Wage-Setting behaviour 
Understanding the wage-setting behaviour of any developing economy would be incomplete 
without studying the informal sector that constitutes a large chunk of its economy.  
5.1 Wage Levels 
In this Section we select firms that have more than one regularly paid worker. There are 681 such 
businesses in our total sample of 960 firms. Although, we do not report results here, as expected, 
employment in the informal manufacturing sector is heavily concentrated in skilled blue-collar 
jobs (79.4 %), the formal sector counterpart has a lower concentration in the blue-collar group 
(63.4 %).
27
 More interestingly, we ask informal sector proprietors about average wage levels in 
their firms using given wage ranges. Based on our experience in the formal sector survey, we 
decided to use smaller wage ranges than in the formal sector, especially at the lower end.  
The wage ranges in the informal sector survey were (i) Up to Rs. 5000 , (ii) Rs. 5001-6000, (iii) 
Rs. 6001-7000 (iv) Rs. 7001-8000, (v) Rs. 8001-10000 and (vi) Rs. 10001 and above.
28
 The 
results in Table 7 show that average wages in the informal sector range between 7 to 8 thousand 
rupees which lies within the average range in the formal sector (seven to ten thousand rupees),  
but at the extreme lower end. To identify the wage differential between the formal and the 
informal sector, we calculate the wage distribution for the two sectors, which gives a clearer 
picture. Specifically, 47.6 percent of the informal sector firms are paying less than the official 
minimum wage i.e. Rs. 7000 in contrast to 17.5 percent for the formal sector.
29
 
                                                          
27
 Employment in the informal manufacturing sector is heavily concentrated in skilled blue-collar jobs (79.4 %), the 
formal sector counterpart has a lower concentration in the blue-collar group (63.4 %). 
28
 In a similar question in the formal sector survey in Ahmed et al. (2014), the wage ranges were wider than in the 
informal sector, the lower three ranges were (i) less than 7000, (ii) 7001-10,000 and (iii) 10,001-15,000 rupees.  
29
 Many previous studies also find wage differentials between the two sectors for different countries: Rand and Torm 
(2012) show that average wages are 10-20% higher in the formal sector among Vietnamese micro-firms and show 
that most of the gap is due to observable factors such as firm size, location and workplace environment. Studying the 
wage penalty for working in the South African informal sector, Badaoui et al. (2007) find a 12 per cent wage penalty 
that disappears once account has been taken of taxation.  
14 
 
Both blue collar and white collar workers are paid below the minimum wage in the informal 
sector. Interestingly, 61.5 percent of the white collar employees in the informal sector are paid 
less than the official minimum wage levels, though the percentage is highest for unskilled blue 
collar workers. In contrast, white collar employees are much better paid in the formal sector than 
in the informal sector (average range of 15-25 thousand rupees).
30
 The greater wage penalty for 
white collar workers in the informal sector may suggest that these workers are willing but not able 
to enter the formal sector due to lower levels of education or training. Working in the informal 
sector is probably a way of avoiding unemployment (Haanwinckel and Soares, 2013); the 
informal sector being an employer of last resort. 
 
 
Recent studies have divided the informal sector into two segments; a competitive voluntary 
sector and a lower-tier sector where jobs are rationed (Bargain and Kwenda, 2009); Fields 
                                                          
30
 The average wage of white collar workers is calculated as the average wage of firms with more white-collar 
workers. 
Table 7.Wage Distribution for Formal and Informal Sector Firms 
Formal Sector  
White Collar 
Employees 
Blue Collar 
Employees 
Unskilled Blue Collar 
Employees Total 
less than 7 6.8 13.7 31.3 17.5 
7-10 50.7 74.2 64.2 69.1 
10 or more 42.5 12.1 4.5 13.4 
Average wage range
a
 10-25 7-10 7-10 7-10 
Informal Sector  
White Collar 
Employees 
Blue Collar 
Employees 
Unskilled Blue Collar 
Employees Total 
less than 7 61.5 45.6 68.2 47.6 
7-10 38.5 42.5 22.7 41 
10 or more 0 12 9.1 11.4 
Average wage range
a
 6-7 7-8 6-7 7-8 
a: Average wages are written in thousand rupees 
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(2005), where workers in the latter segment are willing to accept lower wages to escape 
unemployment (Rand and Torm, 2012). This argument gets support from statistics taken from  
our formal sector survey where firms are willing to pay higher than average wages to attract 
better quality workers, which implies that white collar workers in the informal sector may be 
inferior to those working in the formal sector given their lower average wages. Skilled and 
unskilled blue collar workers in the formal sector are mostly paid competitive wages so may not 
necessarily show similar wage penalty in the informal sector Ahmed et al. (2014).
31
 
 
5.2 Wage adjustment 
We have found that a higher share of informal-sector workers are paid less than the minimum 
wage and that this penalty applies especially to white-collar workers when compared with their 
formal sector peers. We next turn to analysing the frequency of wage changes.  
 
5.2.1 Frequency 
In Druant et al. (2012) and Ahmed et al. (2014) formal-sector firms were asked to state the 
frequency of wage changes and the reasons for changing wages where three reasons were listed, 
i.e. inflation, tenure and changes due to reasons other than these. Respondents were asked to 
indicate whether these wage changes occur (i) quarterly (ii) bi-annually (iii) annually (iv) once in 
every two year
32
 (v) never. The shortest of the wage frequency from any of these frequencies is 
assigned as the overall frequency of wage changes for each firm. 
                                                          
31
 For Mexico, Gong and Van Soest (2002) find that wage differentials between the formal and informal sector are 
typically small for the less educated, and only arise higher levels of education, while Rand and Torm (2012) show 
that the level of education is not significant in explaining formal-informal sector wage gaps. 
32
 Questionnaire in the Punjab missed the every-two-year option, but it does not affect the quality of the wage 
duration estimate as there are only three firms in the Punjab that have not selected the annual or the less than annual 
category.  
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We expect wages in the informal economy to be less rigid than in the formal sector 
because of limited workers’ protection and low entry-exit frictions. This prediction is confirmed 
by the survey responses shown in Table 8 below.  Specifically, we find stark differences in the 
shortest wage frequency (i.e. less than annual changes) category; with 3.5 percent firms in the 
formal sector changing wages at that frequency while the percentage is 47.7 percent in the 
informal sector. Also in the formal sector, wage changes are dominated by annual wage changes 
mainly due to tenure (around 89.8 percent of wage changes are annual) while only 49.3 per cent 
of firms in the informal sector change their wages on an annual basis. In informal sector firms 
annual wage changes are mainly determined by tenure, while inflation is an equally strong driver 
for wage changes that are more frequent than once a year. The higher frequency of wage changes 
affects all occupational groups in the informal sector, more so the white collar group with 63% 
changing wages annually. 
 
Table 8.Wage Change Frequency for Formal and Informal Sector 
 
Informal Formal 
  
Less than 
Annual Annual 
Less than 
Annual Annual 
Over all 47.7 49.3 3.5 89.8 
   Inflation 31.4 49.5 2.7 54.9 
   Tenure 14.8 71.5 0.7 86.2 
   Others 19.4 32.2 0.6 52.8 
     Occupational Group 
      WC 63.0 37.0 0.0 86.9 
   BC 46.5 50.2 4.0 90.6 
   UBC 41.8 53.4 4.0 89.2 
Size
a
 
       Small 
  
3.5 89.7 
   Medium 
  
6.6 89.7 
   Large   0.2 91.3 
a: We have also calculated the statistics for a subgroup of small firms employing 11 to 
20 workers to see if we find any similarity between them and the informal sector 
enterprises. However, the statistics are not significantly different from that of the small 
firms and for this reason we do not report them 
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.As expected, wages in the informal sector are significantly more flexible than in the formal 
sector; mean wage duration is 9.6 months in the informal sector compared to 12.7 months in the 
formal sector as shown in Table 9 (Ahmed et al., 2014).
33
Also, mean duration shows a negative 
relation to the skill level i.e., 8.4, 9.7 and 10.3 months for white, blue and unskilled blue collar 
employees respectively. The pattern is exactly the opposite in the formal sector where white 
collar employees have the longest average wage duration.  This is probably because white collar 
employees in the informal sector are better able to negotiate up their low-wages given their 
superior job stature relative to their blue collar peers.  We also find in Table 9 that firms with 
more unskilled blue collar workers, businesses that were bought by their owners, firms that do 
not hire from the formal sector, very young and very old firms have longer wage duration (i.e. 
close to ten months) although a shorter duration than in the formal sector. A firm’s age is 
positively related to wage duration except for very young firms that have the longest wage 
duration. 
Similarly, we asked firms if they have cut wages during the last five years, and if they 
could describe the reasons for cutting wages. While 97 percent of firms change wages annually 
or more frequently, there are only 3.1 per cent of firms with a history of wage cuts during the last 
five years. However, it is important to note that most wage changes happen due to inflation and 
so the probability of having downward wage changes in high inflation years is also relatively 
low. Indeed, the annualized inflation rate was 12 % during the survey period. The proportion of 
firms that had cut wages during the last five years was 1.3 per cent in the formal sector.
34
 
The reasons for wage flexibility in the informal sector include lower bureaucratic 
requirements and less regulation, especially the regulation of hiring and firing. Second, the 
                                                          
33
 For calculations of mean wage duration see Druant et al. (2012). 
34
 Decrease in product price, turnover and profits remained top three reasons for wage cuts in the informal sector. 
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absence of collective bargaining power of workers in the informal sector makes it easier to hire 
new workers or fire existing ones and to adjust wages, which is difficult for formal sector firms 
due to the existence of labour unions.  Third, informal sector technology itself generates 
flexibility since it is easier to monitor effort and manage relations with workers in small firms, 
which in turn increases the likelihood of competitive wages and wage flexibility (Esfahani and 
Salehi-Isfahani, 1989).
35
 
 
 
Table 9.Wage Durations in the Informal Sector 
Wage Duration in months   
  Months 
Over all 9.6 
WC 8.4 
BC 9.7 
UBC 10.3 
  Self establishes 9.6 
Family Business 9.6 
Purchased 10.1 
1-5 Years 10.0 
6-10 Years 9.3 
11-20 Years 9.6 
21-50 9.8 
51 or more 10.2 
1-3 employees 9.6 
more than 3 9.8 
Hire from formal sector 
 Yes 8.7 
No 10.2 
 
5.2.2 Timing and wage-setting rules  
In adjusting wages a firm may decide to follow a time-dependent rule, a state-dependent rule or a 
combination of the two. Firms following a time-dependent rule change their wages only 
                                                          
35
Woltermann (2003) links the informal sector to better information and job search; he argues that labour market 
segmentations arises from the lack of information on available vacancies in the formal sector, making wages 
relatively rigid  in the formal sector. 
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periodically.
36
 Time-dependent rules are common in both the formal and the informal sector, 
specifically 46.4 percent of informal sector enterprises follow time dependent rule, compared to 
80.3 percent in the formal sector (see Table 10 below). Nonetheless, we see striking differences 
in the percentages between these wage adjustment rules in that significantly fewer firms in the 
informal sector follow strictly time-dependent rule. If anything, this implies that informal sector 
firms respond to large shocks by adjusting wages even though they may normally follow time-
dependent rules. There are also differences between the sectors in the average frequency of wage 
changes under state-dependent rules.  Indeed, there is a large contingent of informal-sector 
businesses, 24.4 percent, following state-dependent rules.  In sum, the evidence suggests that 
wage setting in the informal sector is more flexible and responsive to changes in the external 
environment, which indirectly implies the predominance of state-dependent wage-setting 
strategies. 
Table 10.Wage Adjustment Rules 
% of total firms Informal Formal Small Medium Large 
Time dependent 46.4 80.3 80.1 82.7 80.8 
State Dependent 24.4 5.0 5 4.2 6.4 
Both time and state 29.1 14.7 15 13.1 12.9 
No Pattern for Wage Changes 73.5 17.9 18.6 10.1 18 
Highest Frequency 11.2 43.4 41.1 54.3 61.9 
Month of Highest frequency Jan Jul Jul Jul Jul 
 
Time-dependent rules imply that wage changes may be concentrated in specific months. This 
prediction however does not apply to state-dependent rules, which are more likely to be 
applicable in the informal sector as we discovered earlier. This is important, as the exact timing 
of wage decisions and shocks co-determine the strength of shock transmission and neutrality of 
                                                          
36
 Staggered price models: Taylor (1980); Calvo (1983)); state-dependent firms tend to change wages whenever 
there is large shock to the economy (state dependent prices: Hall et al. (2000)). 
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money supply shocks.
37
 As expected, in comparison to the formal sector, there is significantly 
less concentration of wage changes in any specific month in the informal sector; around 73.5 
percent of informal sector enterprises do not have any pattern of wage change and the highest 
wage change frequency in any month remained 11.2 per cent in January. In the formal sector, the 
highest frequency of wage changes in any month is 43.4 percent in July
38
 and only 17.9 percent 
of firms have no set pattern of wage revisions. 
 
5.3 Determinants of wage changes 
The survey results in Table 11 show that important reasons for upward wage adjustments in the 
informal sector are: i) an increase in a competitor’s wage, ii) high inflation levels and iii) an 
increase in workers’ efficiency. All of the top five reasons are translated into wage adjustments 
within six months.39
 
 
A similar question in the formal sector survey, though with slightly different factors 
listed, showed that the important factors determining wage adjustments are company policy, 
workers’ efficiency and higher profits. The common factor among the top five factors between 
the formal and the informal sectors are: competitors’ wage changes, workers’ efficiency and 
higher profits. Two major differences between the two sectors are the importance of the 
minimum wage in the formal sector and the importance of inflation, a state-dependent variable, 
in the informal sector, both are significantly less important in the other sector.  
                                                          
37
Olivei and Tenreyro (2008) find that  the  adjustment to shocks actually  depends  on  the  timing  of  wage  
changes  and  economic  disturbances.  They  show  that monetary policy innovations in Japan that occur during the 
first half of the year, when most wages are reset, have a relatively smaller effect on output than those occurring later 
in the year. 
38
 January is the second most frequent month for wage changes while formal sector wage changes are closely linked 
to official minimum wage changes that usually occur in July. 
39
Alcaraz (2009) finds that wages in the informal sector adjust quicker than informal sector wages to shocks to the 
economy in Mexico. 
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5.3.1 Minimum wages 
In the informal sector, where labour is more vulnerable to exploitation due to illiteracy, lower 
skill levels and less bargaining power, government’s intervention becomes necessary both from 
the perspective of social justice and also for increasing efficiency and productivity in the 
economy. However, these laws may not be binding in the informal sector.  
 
Table 11.Determinants of wage changes 
 
 
We have found that minimum wage changes play an important role in wage adjustments 
in the formal sector, see Ahmed et al. (2014). In contrast, minimum wages are less important and 
non-binding in the informal sector.  The minimum wage was among the five least important 
factors for wage adjustments in the informal sector; only 31.8 percent of firms ranked it as either 
  
Mean 
Scores
a
 
Mean 
Lag Rank Lags
c
 
% 
important 
or very 
important
b
 
1 Inc in turnover 2.59 4.67 6 7 52.3 
2 Inc in price of product 2.65 4.62 7 6 47.9 
3 Inc in employee efficiency 2.50 4.51 3 4 52.9 
4 Inc in profits 2.54 4.68 5 8 51.6 
5 Inc in wage of competitor firms 2.33 3.84 1 1 63.7 
6 High inflation level 2.41 4.46 2 3 56.1 
7 Low inflation Level 3.43 5.62 11 12 14.2 
8 Rise in demand for labor 3.03 4.83 8 9 31.9 
9 Fall in supply of labor 3.24 5.07 10 10 22.6 
10 Increase in informal sector wage 2.53 4.11 4 2 55.0 
11 Increase  in public sector wage 3.60 5.44 12 11 11.0 
12 Impact of Minimum wage 3.12 4.60 9 5 31.8 
13 Increase in 'formal' sector wage 3.74 5.64 13 13 7.7 
a: 1, 2, 3 and 4 denote “very important”, “important”, “of minor importance” and “unimportant” 
b: percentage of firms responding “important” or “very important” 
c:  2, 3, 4 and 5 denote wage revisions within 1, 3, 6 and 12 months, while 6 represents no change. 
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a very important or an important factor for wage adjustment (74 percent in the formal sector), for 
firms with average wages below minimum wage level the percentage was 47.6 per cent (17.4 
percent in the formal sector).  For 85.3 percent of the firms in the informal sector changes in the 
official minimum wages do not have any employment effects either.
40
 
 
5.3.2 Wage indexation 
Theoretically, workers, being more risk averse than the employers, are concerned about real 
wages more than nominal wages and want to be insured against any unanticipated change in their 
real wages (for details see Keeney and Lawless, 2010).
41
 Wages may be indexed to inflation, 
either completely or partially, as an alternative to costly collective bargaining.  
 
Table 12.Wage Indexation 
            
 % of total Firms Informal Formal Small Medium Large 
No Indexation 52.3 69.7 71.1 60.2 63.0 
Indexation 47.7 30.2 28.9 39.8 37.0 
      Complete Indexation 12.8 7.0 7.7 1.5 4.8 
      Partial Indexation 34.9 23.2 21.2 38.3 32.2 
Past 68.5 66.2 64.6 71.2 76.4 
Expected 31.6 33.9 35.4 28.8 23.6 
 
We asked firms about the extent of wage indexation and if they do whether the reference 
inflation is past inflation or expected inflation. Results are in Table 12 above. The frequency of 
wage indexation is higher in the informal than in the formal sector, 47.7 percent of firms index 
their wages to inflation, out of which 12.8 percent of firms have complete indexation. In contrast, 
                                                          
40
 We asked firms about their employment reaction to changes in the minimum wage level: Making some of their 
permanent employees redundant, casual employees redundant or no change. The results show 85.3 percent of firms 
report that they don’t respond to changes in the minimum wage, only 14.4 percent of the firms reduce their use of 
casual workers. 
41
 In the presence of nominal wage rigidity, the optimal level of inflation to facilitate wage adjustment is high, 
holding all else equal (Akerlof et al, 1996). 
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only 30 percent of firms in the formal sector index their wage to inflation either completely or 
partially.  
The reference inflation rate for indexation also has important policy implications.
42
 Perez 
(2003) concludes that a higher proportion of labour contracts with wages indexed to past 
observed inflation implies that a higher degree of current inflation is explained by past inflation, 
hence inflation may behave as if there were backward-looking expectations in the presence of 
wage indexation (see Vargas et al, 2009; Fraga et al, 2003).
43
 
To analyse the reference inflation rate, we asked firms about the inflation reference to which 
they index their wages. Although indexing wages to inflation is much more common in the 
informal sector, the dependence on lagged inflation is prevalent in both sectors. This backward-
looking nature can explain inflation persistence in Pakistan.
44
 
To explain wage indexation behaviour further, we run an ordered probit regression where the 
dependent variable takes value 2 for complete indexation, 1 for partial indexation and 0 if there 
is no wage indexation. The list of explanatory variables includes a dummy for firms with 1 to 3 
workers in informal sector and greater than 250 employees in the formal sector, dummy 
variables for the share of blue collar workers, firms give bonuses, the age of firms, the level of 
competition in product and labour market, employee turnover and if the firms checked time 
dependency rules (for complete details of all regression variables see Table A1 in Appendix A).  
The results in Table 13 below show that determinants of indexation behaviour vary across 
two sectors. Indexation behaviour also varies significantly between two provinces. Wage-price 
                                                          
42
 While current inflation rate is associated with the stabilizing effects of full indexation from monetary disturbances 
(Gray, 1976; Fischer, 1977), indexation to the already observed or lagged value has negative stabilization effects 
(Simonsen, 1983; Fischer, 1985; 1988; Jadresic, 1996). 
43
 Backward-looking indexation is not very surprising for developed countries with stable inflation histories; 
however, for developing countries, where wage indexation is more prevalent, it may not be an optimal arrangement 
(Moreno, 2009; Lefort and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2002; Druant et al, 2009). 
44
Persistence of inflation levels is in double digits between Sept 2008-Dec 2013. 
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link, the provision of bonuses, share of labour costs and time dependent reviews remained 
significant in the informal sector, while labour market competition and hiring from informal 
sector increased the likelihood of wage indexation in the formal economy.  
 
Table 13. Ordered Probit Model for Wage Indexation 
  
         
 Dependent Variable Wage Indexation
a
 
Informal Formal 
Coef. p-value
b
 Coef. p-value
b
 
1. Province Dummy -0.17 0.065 0.54 0.030** 
2. Firm Size Dummy 0.10 0.268 0.10 0.291 
3. Firm Age Dummy 0.00 0.836 
  4. Share of Labour cost -0.01 0.087* 0.00 0.877 
5. Bonus Dummy 0.55 0.000*** 0.29 0.138 
6. Share of Blue Collar Worker  0.00 0.562 0.00 0.207 
7. Time dependent Dummy -0.19 0.048** -0.12 0.622 
8. Product Market competition -0.01 0.879 -0.04 0.860 
9. Labor Market competition -0.12 0.221 -0.50 0.011** 
10. Wage-Price Link 0.32 0.000*** 0.09 0.590 
11. Firm hire Dummy 0.13 0.186 0.53 0.004*** 
Observations 692 
 
929 
 Pseudo-R square 6.6%   6.5%   
        a: takes value 2 for complete indexation, 1 for partial indexation and 0 for no indexation 
        b: * if p<0.1, ** if p<.05 and *** if p<0.01 
 
 
6. Wage Theories 
Several different explanations for wage rigidity were presented and respondents were asked to 
rank the importance of these theories in preventing wage cuts as very important, important, of 
minor importance or not important. Table 15 shows mean scores for each of the theory 
explaining wage rigidity. Adverse selection, efficiency wages and morale related issues are the 
top three reasons for postponing wage cuts in the informal sector (for details on each of the 
theories consult questionnaire in Appendix B). 
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A comparison of wage theories across the two sectors shows that the top three wage 
theories in the informal sector were in the top four places in the formal sector; the only exception 
is comparative-wage theory that remained the second most important theory for wage stickiness 
in the formal sector, and shifted down to fifth place in the informal sector suggesting a lower 
level of competition in the informal labour market. Nonetheless, the top five reasons remained 
the same in the two sectors.  
Table 14.Wage Theories 
          
   
Rank 
  
Mean 
Score
a
 
% 
important
b
 Informal Formal 
Adverse selection quit 1.6 89.6 1 1 
Outside options attractive 2.0 77.5 2 4 
Workers morale 2.0 74.8 3 3 
Adverse selection Hires 2.2 65.3 4 5 
Comparative wages 2.4 60.6 5 2 
Turnover model 2.5 52.9 6 7 
Insider theory 2.5 51.8 7 6 
Implicit contract 2.6 45.7 8 8 
a: 1, 2, 3 and 4 denote “very important”, “important”, “of minor importance” and “unimportant” 
   b: percentage of firms responding “important” or “very important” 
 
We now move on to study the factors that can explain differences in the level of wage 
rigidity across the two sectors in Pakistan. Our dependent variable is the degree of stickiness 
based on the frequency of wage changes. It takes value 1 if the firm changes wages more 
frequently than a year, 2 if wages are revised annually and 3 if wage changes are less frequent 
than yearly. Hence, our dependent variable is increasing in the degree of stickiness (for complete 
details of all regression variables see Table A1 Appendix A). We explain this stickiness using 
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three broad categories of variables: firm cost structure and product and labour market 
characteristics.
45
 
 
     Table 15. Wage rigidity explained: Ordered Probit Model 
     
Dependent Variable: Informal Formal 
Wage Stickiness
a
 Coef. P>z Coef. P>z 
Province Dummy 0.06 0.532 -0.07 0.794 
Firm Size Dummy 0.17 0.082* 0.08 0.461 
Firm Age 0.00 0.524 
  Share of Labour cost 0.01 0.166 0.03 0.113 
% of Blue Collar 0.00 0.998 0.00 0.529 
Time Dependent Rules 0.44 0.000*** -0.19 0.440 
Product Mkt Competition -0.02 0.870 -0.21 0.378 
Labor Mkt Competition -0.16 0.105 -0.45 0.047** 
Wage-Price Link -0.09 0.200 0.02 0.933 
Employee Turnover -0.42 0.000*** -0.68 0.000*** 
Alternative Cost -0.17 0.086* 0.20 0.330 
Wage Indexation -0.03 0.662 -0.11 0.595 
Firm hire dummy -0.32 0.002*** -0.01 0.955 
Observations 687 
 
916 
 Pseudo R-square 8.3% 
 
11.7% 
 a: It takes value 1 if the firm changes wages more frequently than a year, 2 if wages are 
revised annually and 3 if wage changes are less frequent than yearly. 
   b: * if p<0.1, ** if p<.05 and *** if p<0.01 
 
Wages are less rigid when there is a link between wages and prices, the turnover among workers 
is high, there is competition in the labour market and there are alternative cost-cutting strategies. 
While labour market competition and employees turnover are important for both sector, 
alternative cost cutting strategies are important only for informal sector firms may be due to their 
size. However, a link between wage and prices remained insignificant for wage rigidity in our 
sample. In the informal sector, time-dependent wage setting rules increase wage rigidity, as 
predicted by theory.  This is however not the case for the formal sector.  
                                                          
45
 This specification is commonly used for developed economies for wage -setting, see for example Druant et al. 
(2012) and the literature therein. 
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8. Discussion 
We have explored the wage-setting practices of informal sector firms and compared them to 
those of formal sector firms as described in Ahmed et al. (2014).  The results can be summarised 
as follows.  
1. Low-wage informal sector.   
47.6% of firm in the informal sector pay workers below the minimum wage, while only 
17.5% of the formal sector pay below the minimum wage. Wage differentials between 
formal and informal sectors are especially pronounced for white collar workers. 
2. Sticky informal sector employment and occupations.  
64.3% of respondents were involved in the same or similar business in the past, while 
19.5% moved from other businesses.  In a similar vein, employment history suggests that 
92.9% of the respondents were previously working in the informal.  
3. Wage setting without rules.  
Wage duration in the informal sector is lower; 9.6 versus 13.1 months in the 
informal and the formal sector respectively.  There is a weaker pattern in wage-
setting; 73.5 per cent versus 18.1 per cent of firms having no pattern for wage-
setting in the informal and the formal sector respectively. Informal sector firms 
rely more on state dependent rules, 24.4 per cent relative to 6.8 per cent in the 
formal sector. 
4. Indexation to inflation. 
47.7 % of informal sector firms say that wages are indexed, while only 30% in the 
formal sector say that wages inflation-indexed.  In particular, past inflation and 
not future inflation or productivity matter wage-setting.  Inflation is an important 
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anchor in wage negotiation in the informal labour market, both in terms of 
frequency (greater state dependence and high inflation is among top three reasons 
for wage changes) and magnitude (higher inflation indexation). 
5. Minimum wages not binding. 
In contrast, minimum wages are less important and non-binding in the informal 
sector.  The minimum wage was among the five least important factors for wage 
adjustments in the informal sector. 
6. Wage rigidity for same reasons. 
Similar reasons are found for not cutting wages in a depression between sectors. 
The most important reasons for wage rigidity are: (i) adverse selection (the fear of 
losing better workers), (ii) efficiency wage theory (outside options to workers 
appearing more attractive and (iii) workers’ morale (gift exchange: a type of 
goodwill investment on workers). 
7. Frequent wage changes. 
Informal sector firms have higher frequency of wages changes in both directions 
relative to formal sector firms and the frequencies are lower than a year.   
 
Informal sector firms list financial constraints as one of the most important reason for staying in 
the informal sector.  This implies that their ability to absorb shocks is limited, as clearly seen in 
their lower life expectancy.
46
 The fact that firms rely on state-dependent rules, the fact that wage 
changes are mostly due to inflation; and the fact that indexation is prevalent in wage setting 
imply that (i) workers have low bargaining power (ii) wage expectations are anchored with 
                                                          
46
 Firm age of sampled formal sector firms is 22.8 years (median 19 years), while average age of the informal sector 
firms is 14.6 years (median 12 years).  
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inflation; (iii) inflation determines the amount of wage growth and (iii) inflation also affects the 
frequency of wage revisions. 
 
9. Conclusions 
We conclude that the reason for firms belonging to the informal sectors can mainly be found in 
their lack of working capital and limited access to financial markets. This makes their future 
more uncertain since informal-sector firms face a much higher probability of failure than formal 
sector firms. Belonging to the informal market makes it possible to reduce costs and have more 
flexibility in wage setting in addition to hiring and firing, which can be explained by the absence 
of buffers in the form of working capital or access to bank loans. Informal sector firms live by 
the day and are more insecure, can easily wind up shop and are less keen to invest in physical 
capital – given their lack of access to finance – and the hiring and training of new workers – 
given their low average wages. This implies that entrepreneurs have a shorter time horizon which 
implies that they have a higher discount rate. The informal sector firms employ many workers 
who cannot enter the formal labour market because of a lack of skills, qualifications or 
networking within the formal sector, as manifested by the large wage gap between formal- and 
informal-sector while-collar workers.  
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Appendix A 
Figure A1: Snapshot of Labour Force Survey 2008/9 
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Table A1. Variable details for Regressions 
Variable name Details 
Province Dummy 
Takes value 1 for province of Punjab, and 0 for Sindh. 
Firm size 
For informal sector, firm size is defined as: 0 if firm has employer only, 
1 if firm has 1 to 3 workers and 2 if firm has more than 3 workers. For the 
formal sector size dummy takes value 1 for 10-50 employees, 2 for 
51-250 employees and 3 for large firms (i.e. greater than 250 
employees). 
Firm age firm age in years 
Product market 
competition 
Product market competition is equal to 1 if the competition is very tight 
or tight, 0 otherwise.  
Labour market 
competition 
1 if wages of competitive firms are very important or important for wage 
revisions, 0 otherwise. 
Labour cost share of labour cost in total cost 
Wage-price-Link 
0 for no link or don’t know, 1 weak link, 2 definite link (either wage follow 
prices or prices follow wage),  
Employee turnover 
1 if employee turnover model is ranked as very important or important, 0 
otherwise 
Indexation 
Equals 2 in case of complete indexation, 1 for partial indexation and 0 
if firm has not indexed its wages to inflation 
Firm hire 
1 if firm in one sector of economy has hired from the other sector (i.e 
a formal firm has hired employees from the informal sector or for 
informal sector firm if it has hired from formal sector), 0 otherwise. 
Alternative cost 1 if firm has used any alternative labour cost cutting strategy, 0 otherwise 
Bonus 1 if firms provide bonuses, 0 otherwise 
BC share of blue collar workers 
Time dependent 
1 if firm follows strictly time dependent wage review rule, 0 
otherwise. 
Wage frequency Equals 0 if , 1 if and 2 if 1 if firm change wage more frequent that a  
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Appendix B: The Survey 
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Profile Section 
 
Note: Please confirm before the interview that  
 the selected firm is not registered 
 the firm has 10 or less than 10 employees who are not registered with Social security and/or 
EOBI and  
 that you are talking with decision maker 
 
 
Firm Profile 
 
We would like to have following information about your firm.  
 
1. Name of the firm/proprietor: 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Address of the firm (if available)_____________________________________________________ 
 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Contact numbers (if available) Office _________________________Cell ____________________ 
 
4. How many persons of the following categories are engaged in the enterprise? 
4.1 Working proprietor                                                                                        numbers 
4.2 Unpaid family workers                                                                                  numbers 
4.3 Paid Employees47         numbers 
4.3.1 Regular Employees with fixed wage                              numbers 
4.3.2 Casual employees                                                              numbers 
4.3.3 Paid worker by piece rate or work performed              numbers 
4.3.4 Paid non-family apprentice                                              numbers 
 
5. Type of business/Sector 
 5.1 Manufacturing  ____________________5.1.1 Sub Sector ____________________________ 
 
 
6. How many years has the firm been in this business: ____________________________ 
 
7. How did you acquire this business (Please tick one) 
 7.1 Self establishment          
 7.2 Passed on by family         
                                                          
47
 The standardized definition of a paid employee, regular employee and casual employee should be consulted 
from the Wage Survey.   
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 7.3 Purchased a running business          
Proprietor Profile 
1. Age    years       
2. Sex    Male    Female   
3. Marital status   Married    Unmarried  
4. Level of education (Please tick one) 
4.1 Illiterate    
4.2 Below primary   
4.3 Primary passed    
4.4 Matric passed     
4.5 Intermediate passed   
4.6 Degree holder or higher education     
 
5. Have you ever completed any formal technical/vocational training related to your business 
5.1 Yes     5.2 No     
6.   Have you moved from a rural to an urban area to work in this business? 
6.1 Yes     6.2 No     
7. Prior to being involved in this business, what was your employment status? 
7.1 Involved in a similar business     (Skip Q9) 
7.2 Involved in other business     (Skip Q8) 
7.3 Unemployed       (Go to Q11) 
7.4 Unemployed and also did not tried to find any job  (Go to Q11) 
 
8. If you were involved in a similar business, then what was your employment status?  
(Please circle one box only) 
 
 Formal Informal 
8.1 Employed in the  1 2 
8.2 Self employed in the  1 2 
 
9. If you were involved in other business, then what was your employment status?  
(Please circle one box only) 
 
 Formal Informal 
9.1 Employed in the  1 2 
9.2 Self employed in the  1 2 
 
10. If either employed or self employed, how does you previous monthly income compare your current 
monthly earnings. Is it  
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10.1 Higher   10.2 Lower  10.3 Similar    
 
11. How much are the following factors important for your current 
status of business?  
 (Please indicate their importance by choosing one option per row) 
Very 
important 
(1) 
Important 
(2) 
Of Minor 
Importance  
(3) 
Un- 
important 
(4) 
11.1 
Lack of opportunities in the formal sector forced me to start 
my own business 1 2 3 4 
11.2 
My skills do not meet the requirement of the formal sector 
1 2 3 4 
11.3 
I do not have the financial resources to operate in the formal 
sector 1 2 3 4 
11.4 
The nature and scale of production is more suitable in this 
setup 1 2 3 4 
11.5 
There is sufficient demand for my product by other firms 
1 2 3 4 
11.6 
My clients are large, formal firms who sub contract aspects of 
their production/services as I am able to produce cheaply 
1 2 3 4 
11.7 
I find it burdensome in terms of time and information 
gathering to register my business 1 2 3 4 
11.8 
I find it costly to register my business  
1 2 3 4 
11.9 
I want to avoid dealing with bureaucracy/government on a 
continuous basis  1 2 3 4 
11.10 I can operate in the formal sector, but the returns in the 
informal sector are higher 1 2 3 4 
11.11 
I can operate in the formal sector, but the informal sector 
allows greater flexibility in all aspects of running my business 1 2 3 4 
11.12 
I do not value the benefits, such as pensions, official 
recognition etc. that I may be able to derive by operating in 
the formal sector 
1 2 3 4 
 
  
39 
 
 
Survey of Wage Setting Behaviour in Pakistan 
Preliminary Remarks: 
 This survey intends to find out about your wage setting behavior. 
 It focuses on EMPLOYEES defined as those workers working in continuation for at least one 
month and receiving monetary wages in return.  
 Some questions ask about CASUAL EMPLOYEES i.e. the employees who work for less than a 
month and should not be confused with the Employees stated above. 
 This survey does not apply to any firm where there are no employees falling into the definition of 
EMPLOYEE stated above e.g. own account workers, unpaid family workers. 
 State Bank of Pakistan guarantees that your answers will be treated with high degree of 
confidentiality and will only be used for research purposes. The information collected will be 
shared/used at the aggregate level rather than at the firm level. 
 
Q.1: How many employees on average worked in your firm in 2011?   _____________ 
Q.2A: What is the composition of employees in your firm in the following categories?  
2.1  Office or service level employees (White  Collar)   %______  or   ________ Nos. 
2.2 Skilled  workers (Blue Collar)                                    %______  or   ________ Nos. 
2.3  Unskilled   workers (Blue Collar)                              %______  or   ________ Nos. 
 
Q.2B: What was the average wage in your firm in 2011?48  
 Up to Rs. 5000 
 Rs. 5001-6000 
 Rs. 6001-7000 
 Rs. 7001-8000 
 Rs. 8001-10000 
 Rs. 10001 and above 
Q 3.1: Do your employees receive bonuses? 
 YES 
 NO 
 
                                                          
48
 This question was included only for Sindh province 
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Q.3.2: If YES what are they based on? (Circle all relevant options) 
       3.2.1     Performance 
       3.2.2     Profit 
       3.2.3     Turnover 
       3.2.4     Others (please specify) ---------------- 
 
Q.6: In response to the following factors, on average, how soon  are the wages of employees' change in 
your firm? 
 Within a 
month 
Within a 
quarter 
Within 6 
months 
Within a 
year 
Within two 
years 
Never 
6.1) Due to inflation 
 
      
6.2) Due to tenure 
 
      
6.3) Due to reasons other than 
tenure and/ or inflation (e.g. 
productivity, profit. high 
turnover) 
      
 
Q.7: Under normal circumstances, in which months are wages usually revised? 
January July 
February August 
March September 
April October 
May November 
June December 
 There is no fixed time 
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  Q.8.1: Is there any sort of indexation between inflation and wage revisions? 
 Complete 
 Partial 
 None 
Q. 8.2: If the above answer is (1.Complete) or (2.Partial)  then how are wages indexed to inflation? 
 Past Inflation 
 Expected Inflation 
 If a combination of both  then  specify  the respective percentages: 
 
a)   Past Inflation _________% 
b) Expected Inflation_______% 
(Sum should be 100%) 
Q.10: In revising wages upwards, how important are the following factors and how quickly do you 
respond to them? 
 Very 
Important 
Important Of minor 
importance 
Unimportant *Tenure 
(No. 1  
is not 
applicable) 
10.1) Increase in turnover      
10.2) Increase in prices of 
your product/services 
     
10.3) Increase in employee 
efficiency 
     
10.4) Increase in profit      
10.5) Increase in wages of 
competitive firms 
     
10.6) High inflation level      
10.7) Low inflation level      
10.8) Rise in demand for 
labour 
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10.9) Fall in supply of 
labour 
     
10.10)Increase in wages in 
the informal sector 
     
10.11)Increase in wages in 
public sector 
     
10.12)Impact of change in 
Minimum Wage Level 
on the wages of all 
employees 
     
10.13)Increase in wages in 
formal sector 
     
*Tenure: 2= Within 1 month,  3= Within 3 months,  4= Within 6 months,  5= Within 1 year,  6= No 
change 
 
Q11: Over the last 5 years have the wages of employees in your firm ever been cut/ reduced? 
 YES             (Go to Q.12) 
 NO               (Skip Q.12) 
Q.12: In revising wages downwards, how important are the following factors and how quickly do you 
respond to them?  
 
 Very 
Important 
Important Of minor 
importance 
Unimportant *Tenure 
(No. 1  
is not 
applicable) 
12.1) Decrease in turnover      
12.2) Decrease in prices of your      
12.3) Decrease in employee 
efficiency 
     
12.4) Decrease  in  profits      
43 
 
12.5) Decrease in wages of 
competitive firms 
     
12.6) Fall in demand for labour      
12.7) Rise in supply of labour      
*Tenure: 2= Within 1 month,  3= Within 3 months,  4= Within 6 months,  5= Within 1 year,  6= No 
change 
 
Q. 13: How important are the following in preventing wage cuts? 
13.1) It would reduce employees' effort, resulting in less output or poorer service because outside 
opportunities appear more attractive 
13.2)  It would have a negative impact on employees' morale and loyalty to the firm 
13.3)  In the presence of wage cut, the most productive employees may quit the firm 
13.4 ) It would create difficulties in attracting new  workers 
13.5) A wage cut would increase the number of employees who quit; increasing the cost of hiring 
and training new workers 
13.6) Workers dislike unpredictable reductions in income. Therefore, workers and firm reach an 
implicit understanding that wages neither fall in recessions nor rise in expansions 
13.7 ) Employees compare their wages to that of similarly qualified workers in other firms in the 
same market 
13.8) Fear of non-cooperation by existing employees prevents average wage reduction 
Note: 1: very important, 2: Important, 3: Of minor importance and 4: Unimportant 
Q. 14: Has any of the following strategies ever been used in your firm to reduce labour costs? 
(Please circle all options applicable to your firm.) 
14.1    Reduction or elimination of bonuses. 
14.2    Adjustment of hours worked per employee. 
14.3    Recruitment of new workers at lower wage in place of those who left/retired. 
14.4    Reduce the number of casual employees. 
14.5    None 
 
Q15.3: If government raises the Minimum Wage, which of the following strategies will you use? 
 (Please circle all options applicable to your firm.) 
44 
 
15.3.1     Reduce employees 
15.3.2     Reduce casual employees   
15.3.3     No change 
Q. 17: What was the percentage of labour cost in total cost of production for your firm in 2011? 
 Up to 10 percent 
 11-25 percent 
 26-50 percent 
 51-75 percent 
 76-100 percent 
Q. 18: Is training provided to new employees? 
 Yes 
 No 
Q. 19: Do you employ workers who, before joining your firm, worked in the formal sector? 
 Yes            (Skip Q.21) 
 No              (Skip Q.20) 
 
 
